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Who	supports	Catalan	independence,	and	is	there	a
way	forward?
Using	recent	survey	data,	Sergi	Pardos-Prado	explains	that	support	for	independence	in	Catalonia	is
strongly	driven	by	education	and	language,	and	robustly	associated	with	liberal	sociocultural	values.
When	it	comes	to	the	way	forward,	there	is	little	consensus	on	the	best	outcome	for	Catalonia:	those
who	favour	independence	are	not	in	a	majority,	but	those	who	oppose	independence	are	split	on	the
best	alternative.	However,	a	degree	of	consensus	does	exist	on	the	process,	with	a	large	majority
believing	a	referendum	should	be	held	to	determine	Catalonia’s	future.
On	14	October,	the	trial	of	Catalonia’s	independence	leaders	concluded	with	prison	sentences	ranging	from	9	to	13
years.	This	sentence	started	a	new	phase	in	the	conflict,	sparking	multiple	protests	across	Catalan	municipalities.
The	polarisation	of	the	territorial	conflict	in	Spain	is	crucial	for	understanding	the	unprecedented	success	of	the
radical	right	party	Vox,	which	advocates	the	preservation	of	Spanish	unity,	a	revisionist	perspective	on	the	Franco
regime,	and	an	ultra-conservative	cultural	agenda.
Despite	the	worrying	escalation	of	events,	the	discussion	of	different	political	ways	forward	is	notoriously	lacking.
This	piece	attempts	to	analyse	the	current	profile	of	secessionist	voters,	in	order	to	envision	their	motivations	and
potential	paths	for	accommodation.	I	use	data	from	the	most	recent	barometer	fielded	by	the	Catalan	Centre	of
Opinion	Studies	(including	a	random	probability	sample	of	1,500	individuals	representative	of	the	Catalan
population).	Secondly,	I	analyse	public	support	for	two	potential	ways	forward,	namely	a	federal	solution	and	a
referendum	of	self-determination.	More	specifically,	I	focus	on	the	level	and	distribution	of	support	across	different
forms	of	national	identity,	in	order	to	explore	broader	and	less	polarising	coalitions.
The	secessionist	voter:	economic	and	cultural	motivations
Figure	1	depicts	the	level	of	support	for	an	independent	Catalonia	across	levels	of	monthly	household	income.	The
graph	confirms	that	support	for	independence	is	lower	among	the	poorest	categories	(€1,200	and	below).	However,
the	pattern	is	less	linear	than	what	is	sometimes	implied,	showing	significant	support	across	a	wide	range	of
categories	in	the	middle	of	the	continuum:	support	for	independence	is	right	at	or	beyond	50%	in	households
earning	between	€1,201	and	€4,500.	Secessionism	goes	down	among	some	of	the	most	well-off	categories
(€4,501-€6,000),	only	to	pick	up	again	in	the	richest	category	(above	€6,000).
Figure	1:	Secessionism	and	income
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Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
The	relationship	between	secessionism	and	income	is	thus	not	perfectly	linear,	and	tends	to	pick	up	at	middle	and
middle-high	levels	of	income.	It	would	be	a	mistake,	then,	to	characterise	secessionism	as	a	movement	exclusively
of	‘the	rich’.	Group	size	is	a	crucial	factor	to	avoid	this	sort	of	individualistic	fallacy	(i.e.	inferring	group-level
associations	from	individual-level	data).	Even	if	it	is	true	that	support	for	independence	grows	with	income,	the
histogram	depicted	in	Figure	1	shows	that	there	is	practically	nobody	in	the	richest	categories,	suggesting	that	the
independence	movement	draws	support	from	a	range	of	highly	populated	and	intermediate	income	categories.
Figure	2	shows	that	secessionism	is	predominant	among	the	highly	educated	(secondary	and	university	levels),
who	tend	to	have	more	liberal	cultural	values.	In	fact,	support	for	independence	is	clearly	stronger	among	people
agreeing	or	strongly	agreeing	with	the	statement	‘gay	couples	should	be	able	to	adopt	children	under	the	same
conditions	as	straight	couples’	(Figure	3).	Secessionism	also	correlates	strongly	with	pro-immigration	attitudes,	and
is	majoritarian	among	those	who	disagree	or	strongly	disagree	with	the	statement	‘With	so	much	immigration,	one
doesn’t	feel	like	at	home	anymore’.	The	educational	and	attitudinal	profile	of	the	secessionist	voter	is	thus	a	mirror
image	of	many	radical	right	electorates	in	Europe,	questioning	the	anti-liberal	and	supremacist	characterisation	of
the	movement.	It	is	also	true	that	a	full	analysis	of	its	nativist	character	should	include	attitudes	towards	groups
coming	from	other	Spanish	regions.
Figure	2:	Secessionism	and	education
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Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
Figure	3:	Secessionism	and	cultural	values
Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
Figure	4	summarises	the	statistical	effect	of	some	key	predictors	and	their	95%	confidence	intervals	(on	the	basis	of
linear	probability	models	with	support	for	independence	as	the	dependent	variable).	The	left	panel	shows	that	the
effect	of	income	disappears	when	controlling	for	other	confounders,	questioning	the	causal	effect	of	economic
motivations.	Education	and	the	most	frequently	used	language	are	the	most	significant	predictors.	The	effect	of
language	is	particularly	strong,	with	individuals	speaking	only	Catalan	or	both	languages	being	more	likely	to
support	independence	than	Spanish-only	speakers.
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The	right	panel	of	Figure	4	adds	anti-immigrant	and	anti-LGBT	attitudes,	which	are	strongly	and	negatively
associated	with	secessionism.	The	effect	of	education	becomes	insignificant,	suggesting	that	education	is	driving
liberal	sociocultural	values.	The	point	is	not	to	prove	any	causal	relationship	between	liberal	values	and
secessionism,	but	to	show	that	they	are	strongly	associated.
Figure	4:	Multivariate	analysis	predicting	support	for	secession
Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
Support	for	federalism	and	self-determination
There	are	two	canonical	paths	forward	in	contexts	of	polarised	centre-periphery	conflicts:	a	federal	arrangement
and	a	referendum	of	self-determination.	Figure	5	shows	the	level	of	support	for	different	state	forms	(left	panel)	and
the	agreement	with	the	statement	“Catalonia	has	the	right	to	hold	a	referendum	of	self-determination”	(right	panel).
When	looking	at	support	for	different	state	forms,	none	of	them	is	close	to	reaching	a	clear	majority.	However,
support	for	an	independent	Catalonia	is	the	strongest	plurality	(around	40%).	This	sheds	light	on	the	reasons
behind	the	current	stalemate:	secessionists	are	not	a	majority,	but	non-secessionists	are	split	on	the	best	way
forward.	Each	single	option	on	its	own	(back	to	being	just	a	region,	keeping	the	current	status	quo,	or	enhanced
federalism)	garners	less	support	than	independence.
Figure	5:	Support	for	different	state	forms	and	an	independence	referendum
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Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
The	right	panel	of	Figure	5	reveals	the	only	super-majority	in	the	range	of	preferences	analysed,	namely	the
agreement	or	strong	agreement	with	the	right	to	hold	a	referendum	(75%	of	support).	The	comparison	between
support	for	different	state	forms	and	a	referendum	is	not	fully	accurate,	since	the	referendum	is	asked	in	a	question
on	its	own,	and	the	state	forms	are	different	options	in	a	single	survey	question.	It	is	therefore	likely	that	some
respondents	agreeing	with	a	referendum	do	not	see	it	as	their	first	option,	even	if	they	are	ultimately	fine	with	it.
Figure	6:	Support	for	federalism	and	an	independence	referendum	across	national	identities
Source:	Compiled	by	the	author.
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Figure	6	disaggregates	the	support	for	a	federal	solution	and	for	a	referendum	across	different	types	of	national
identity.	The	left	panel	shows	how	support	for	federalism	is	bigger	among	intermediate	identities	(feeling	as	Spanish
as	Catalan,	and	more	Catalan	than	Spanish),	even	if	it	falls	short	of	the	50%	threshold	across	the	whole	identity
continuum.	By	contrast,	support	for	a	referendum	seems	to	garner	a	larger	and	broader	coalition	among	the	most
populated	identities:	clearly	above	50%	among	people	feeling	as	Spanish	as	Catalan	(the	most	populated
category),	and	close	to	100%	of	agreement	among	people	feeling	more	or	only	Catalan.	The	coalition	supporting	a
referendum	only	leaves	out	people	who	feel	more	or	only	Spanish,	constituting	3.87%	and	6.68%	of	the	electorate
respectively.
In	conclusion,	support	for	independence	in	Catalonia	is	strongly	driven	by	education	and	language,	and	robustly
associated	with	liberal	sociocultural	values.	The	positive	effect	of	income	is	not	perfectly	linear,	and	disappears
when	controlling	for	other	sociological	confounders.	The	only	super-majority	able	to	bridge	identity	divides	across
the	most	populated	sections	of	the	electorate	is	found	when	measuring	support	for	a	referendum	of	self-
determination.	Given	the	lack	of	consensus	on	the	final	outcome	of	the	relationship	between	Catalonia	and	Spain,
perhaps	more	efforts	should	be	devoted	to	re-focus	the	debate	on	the	method	to	solve	this	conflict,	which	seems	to
attract	stronger	and	more	diverse	coalitions	of	support.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	Joan	Morejón	/	Assemblea.cat	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
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